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REVIEWS OF BOOKS.

Einleitung in die Philosophie. Von OSWALD KÜLPE, Professor an der Universität Würzburg. Leipzig, S. Hirzel, 1895.—pp. viii, 276.

Külpe distinguishes between an introduction to philosophy which consists in presenting a system in outline (in stating the chief problems of philosophy and intimating the solutions which commend themselves to the writer), and one which, ignoring or keeping in the background the writer's own personal views, aims at presenting a bird's-eye view of the whole field of philosophical endeavor of the past and present. Külpe's *Introduction* aims to be of the latter sort. Assuming no previous knowledge of the subject on the part of his reader, he seeks to give him an insight into the development and present condition of philosophy in its various branches. He divides his work into four parts or chapters. In the first he treats briefly of the definition and divisions of philosophy as historically determined; in the second he considers in considerable detail the different philosophical disciplines; in the third he treats, also in considerable detail, the principal directions or tendencies of philosophical thought, and explains the important philosophical distinctions; and in the last he sketches briefly what, on the basis of what has gone before, he conceives to be the true definition and systematization of philosophy.

Chapter I, *Begriff und Eintheilung der Philosophie*, gives us, first, a rapid yet clear account of the various conceptions formed of philosophy in the past and the present. None of these is regarded as in itself satisfactory,—as determined, that is, by the real nature of the subject-matter; they are, rather, definitions of the science as it has been presented in actual systems. An independent attempt at defining philosophy is reserved for the last chapter. Next, attention is called to the fact that just as the definition of philosophy has varied, so likewise have the divisions of the subject, some disciplines formerly recognized as philosophical being no longer regarded as such. The attempt, therefore, to give a systematic and comprehensive classification of philosophical disciplines which would be accepted, is impossible while there is no accepted definition of philosophy itself. After giving, therefore, the more important fundamental divisions of philosophy which have been proposed,

Külpe classifies, for the purposes of his work, the disciplines actually recognized to-day as philosophical into two groups, *general* and *special*, the former treating of the presuppositions, completion, and exposition of the whole field of knowledge, the latter of a particular branch of knowledge. The general philosophical disciplines are metaphysics, epistemology, and logic; the special are the philosophy of nature, psychology, ethics and philosophy of rights, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, and the philosophy of history (including sociology).

Chapter II, *Die philosophischen Disciplinen*, devotes a section to each of the disciplines named. The general disciplines are treated first. After presenting the various conceptions of metaphysics given in the course of the history of philosophy, Külpe declares that the task of metaphysics is to give us a *Weltanschauung*, — a rational and unitary view of the sum-total of reality. Metaphysics as the science of the most general principles or concepts, he identifies with epistemology. Logic treats of the most general *forms* of knowledge. Epistemology treats of the most general *contents* of knowledge. Locke is declared to have been the real founder of epistemology. He it was who, in his *Essay*, first undertook a systematic investigation into the origin, certainty, nature, and extent of human knowledge. Since the sixties of our century the main endeavor of philosophers has been to construct a sound theory of knowledge as the assured basis of all philosophy and science. Epistemology has to critically investigate (1) the possibility of knowledge; (2) the separation of the content of knowledge into subjective and objective; (3) the distinction of the formal and material elements in knowledge; (4) the most general concepts of being and becoming. In addition to investigating these logical presuppositions of *all* special sciences, epistemology has to consider certain special concepts common only to a particular group of the sciences, such concepts, for example, as matter, force, energy, life, the soul. It has also to deal with the relation between psychical and physical processes, etc. It is no wonder that Professor Külpe writes: "Undoubtedly epistemological investigations are among the most difficult in the whole field of philosophy."

The author turns next to the special philosophical disciplines. In treating these (and the treatment is excellent throughout) he is careful to distinguish the properly philosophical problems from the strictly scientific ones connected with them. Take, for example, psychology. A scientific psychology, he finds, leaves unanswered,

while forcing forward for answer, a multitude of properly philosophical problems. The consideration of these constitutes psychology as a department of philosophy, or the philosophy of mind. This has as its task to investigate (1) the epistemological and logical presuppositions of empirical psychology, such as the concept of the psychical subject or individual, psychical causality, the analytic and synthetic and genetic methods, etc.; (2) the fundamental concepts employed in empirical psychology, such as consciousness and the unconscious, the soul and its relations to the body, psychical 'element,' etc.; (3) the general theories of scientific psychology, such as those concerning our ideas of space and time, association, sense perception, etc. As the first modern contribution to such a philosophical psychology Külpe names Rehmke's *Lehrbuch der allgemeinen Psychologie* (1894), and would doubtless have added the still abler work by Professor Ladd on *The Philosophy of Mind* (1895) had he been acquainted with it in time. It is particularly gratifying to find Professor Külpe, who is a thoroughly up-to-date scientific psychologist, as his *Grundriss* abundantly shows, thus frankly recognizing and cordially encouraging the consideration of these wider problems of psychology. His attitude toward these questions is in striking contrast with that taken by some conspicuous cultivators of scientific psychology in this country.

Chapter III, *Die philosophischen Richtungen*, is by far the most important. The author begins with an enumeration of the directions or tendencies of philosophical thought, so far as these relate to the *content* of the various philosophical disciplines treated in the previous chapter. These directions or tendencies of thought are divided into three groups,—metaphysical, epistemological, and ethical. The metaphysical are divided into five subclasses, the first and second having a general, the other three a special significance in the formation of a *Weltanschauung*. The first deals with the *number* of ultimate principles postulated, and the possible conceptions are Singularism and Pluralism. The second relates to the quality, or nature, of the ultimate principles, and as our principles may be either those of being or those of becoming, we have the metaphysical lines of thought relating to being expressed by the terms 'materialism,' 'spiritualism,' 'dualism,' and 'monism'; and those relating to becoming (or causality) expressed by the terms 'mechanism' and 'teleology' (finality). Of the three special metaphysical tendencies, the first may be called the theological, as it relates to the conception of a Supreme Being; and here we have pantheism, theism, deism,

and atheism as rival views presented for our acceptance. The second relates to the problem of freedom, and gives rise to the contrasted conceptions, determinism and indeterminism (freedom). The last deals with the nature of the soul; the acceptance or rejection of a soul-substance giving us 'substantialism' and 'actualism,' and the question as to the primacy of intellect or of will, giving us 'intellectualism' and 'voluntarism.' The character of any particular metaphysical system will be determined by the position which its author takes in these various directions. For example, Külpe characterizes Spinoza as a singularist, monist, mechanist, pantheist, determinist, actualist and intellectualist; Lotze, on the other hand, as a qualified singularist, a spiritualist, a teleologist, a theist, an indeterminist, a substantialist. The tendencies belonging to the five groups may, however, be differently combined in different systems.

The epistemological directions of thought relate, according to Külpe, to (1) the *origin* of knowledge, giving us rationalism, empiricism, and criticism; (2) the validity, or limits, of knowledge, giving us dogmatism, skepticism, positivism, and criticism; (3) the nature of the object or content of knowledge, giving us idealism, realism, phenomenism. Finally, the tendencies or lines of ethical thought relate to (1) the origin of morality,—intuitionism or apriorism, and empiricism or evolutionism; (2) the ethical motive, — *Gefühlsmoral* and *Reflexionsmoral*, according as the motive is regarded as some form of feeling or of reflective thought; (3) the ethical object, — individualism and universalism; (4) the ethical end, — subjective feeling (hedonism, eudaemonism), or objectivism (perfectionism, evolutionism, naturalism, utilitarianism). To take the same examples as before, Spinoza, in epistemological characteristics, is a rationalist, dogmatist, and realist; in ethical, an autonomist, egoist, objectivist, and as regards the ethical motive, occupies a mediating position; Lotze, on the other hand, accepts criticism, realism, autonomism, intuitionism, altruism, and eudaemonism, while, as regards the ethical motive, he is a *Gefühlsmoralist*.

After thus classifying the directions or tendencies of philosophical thought, Professor Külpe explains and discusses each in turn. His discussions exhibit wide and accurate historical knowledge, are uniformly clear and impartial, and on the whole, show an admirable grasp of the subjects considered. This part of the work we believe would be especially helpful to the beginner, enabling him to get clearly before his mind the great issues in philosophical speculation, past and present.

It is unnecessary to follow in detail Professor Külpe's discussions; but two or three of his positions may be noticed. His brief criticism of materialism (pp. 132-137), in the course of which attention is called to the absolute lack of an epistemological foundation for materialism, is especially good. Of the four competing views, materialism, spiritualism, dualism, and monism, Külpe himself leans toward dualism as on the whole the most probable, since it harmonizes with science and satisfies epistemological and logical demands. The least tenable is materialism; while, next to dualism, spiritualism is regarded as most tenable. The author notices the fact that metaphysical monism is by most of its adherents but a form of spiritualism, and in a note calls attention to the various meanings of the term 'monism.' The brief criticism (pp. 190-193) of the *Actualitätstheorie* which Wundt and others offer as a substitute for the theory of the soul as substance, is worthy of notice. In dealing with idealism, Külpe takes the ground that epistemology is incompetent to decide the question as to the reality of a non-ego. When epistemology has determined the character of the subjective and the objective in connection with the quality of the original content of experience, it has done all that rightly belongs to it. For anything further we must look to metaphysics. In the discussion of rationalism, empiricism, and criticism, we are told that the whole question as to the origin of knowledge is a psychological, and in no true sense an epistemological, question, and that the inquiry into the universal validity and necessity of knowledge belongs to logic. It seems, therefore, rather inconsistent to treat these topics under the head of epistemology.

The closing chapter, *Aufgabe und System der Philosophie*, although very brief, presents some suggestive remarks on the definition and systematization of philosophy.

When one attempts, in so brief a space, to treat so many great subjects as the author does in this little manual, there is danger of losing the sense of proportion and of becoming at times superficial or too abstract. It is too much to say that Professor Külpe has wholly escaped these and other faults of treatment. We notice a tendency toward an unnecessary multiplication of terms and refinement of distinctions. Occasionally, too, there is a lack of precision in statement. For example, speaking of the various forms of the ontological argument for the being of God, the author remarks: "Sie alle kommen darauf hinaus, aus dem Begriff eines Wesens seine Existenz zu erschliessen,"—which is correct only when we insert

before *Wesens* the all-important qualifying adjective *allervollkommensten*. But in spite of such defects and others which might be pointed out, Professor Külpe has succeeded in producing an unusually good book of its kind, and one which we would gladly welcome in a good English rendering.

GEORGE MARTIN DUNCAN.

A Short Study of Ethics. By CHARLES F. D'ARCY, B.D.
London and New York, Macmillan & Co., 1895. — pp. xix, 278.

The object of this book is, in the author's own words, "to give, *in small space*, an account as well of the metaphysical basis as of the ethical superstructure." Its standpoint is, in the main, that of the late Professor Green, and it follows very closely on the lines of the shorter expositions of Professor Dewey, Mr. Muirhead, and Professor Mackenzie. Mr. D'Arcy's criticism of the latter works is that "all three build without a foundation." To the reader who is familiar with Professor T. H. Green's ethical method, the lucidity of these books is admirable. But the author cannot help wondering whether his enjoyment in reading them would have been as great as it was if he had not previously made the acquaintance of the great *Prolegomena*, a work which "among all modern English contributions" to ethical literature "stands easily first" (Preface). To remedy this defect of the more recent Neo-Hegelian presentations of the subject, Mr. D'Arcy follows Green's example, and devotes the first Part of his book to "the philosophical basis of ethics." Here it soon becomes evident that, in spite of his general adherence to the standpoint of his master, Mr. D'Arcy is rethinking the questions for himself, and does not hesitate, in important particulars, to criticise and to modify the answers given by Green and his disciples. He agrees with Green's metaphysics of knowledge, and re-states his doctrine of the spiritual principle in nature, and of reality as a system of relations. His re-statement does not, in my opinion, add to the persuasiveness of the doctrine: his effort to resolve the sensational matter into the relational form of knowledge meets with no better success than previous efforts of a similar sort. The familiar reconciliation of freedom and necessity produces a like impression. The most valuable chapter of this Part is that in which Mr. D'Arcy parts company with his teachers, and ventures an independent contribution to philosophical theory, — Chapter V, entitled "Community." What he calls "the point of discontinuity in all idealisms" occurs "where the effort is made to distinguish, and at the same time to reconcile,